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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Anthony Loya, Jr., appeals from his conviction and sentence for
battery on a law enforcement officer.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At the time of trial, Officer Justin Cyr was a law enforcement officer for 11
years. (Tr., p. 165, L. 2 – p. 166, L. 2.) He worked at the Twin Falls Police
Department for four years, and before that had worked in the Twin Falls County
Jail as a detention deputy for three years. (Tr., p. 165, Ls. 19-22.)
On November 4, 2015, dressed in his police uniform, Officer Cyr went to
La Fiesta Mexican restaurant regarding a report of burglary and possession of
stolen property. (Tr., p. 176, Ls. 2-24.) His investigation led him from La Fiesta
to a home in Twin Falls. (Tr., p. 180, L. 21 – p. 182, L. 1.) The home owner
granted Officer Cyr permission to enter and search for stolen property. (Tr., p.
182, Ls. 2-17.) When Officer Cyr unlocked a door and went into a bathroom
under the stairs he found Loya, sitting in the dark. (Tr., p. 188, L. 9 – p. 190, L.
23; p. 191, L. 11 – p. 193, L. 6.)
Officer Cyr knew there was an active warrant for Loya’s arrest. (Tr., p.
193, L. 11 – p. 194, L. 12.) He asked Loya if Loya recognized him from the jail,
and Loya indicated he did. (Tr., p. 194, Ls. 13-18; State’s Exhibit 1, at 4:104:37.) Officer Cyr asked Loya to take his hands out of his pockets. (Tr., p. 194,
Ls. 19-25.) Instead Loya punched Officer Cyr in the face with a closed fist and
then continued to punch him in the head area. (Tr., p. 195, Ls. 1-7; p. 201, L. 4 –
1

p. 202, L. 1.) Eventually Officer Cyr was able to subdue Loya and take him into
custody. (Tr., p. 201, L. 24 – p. 209, L. 17.) A detention officer at the jail located
contraband in Loya’s possession. (Tr., p. 251, L. 19 – p. 255, L. 20.) The state
charged Loya with battery on a law enforcement officer and possession of
methamphetamine. (R., pp. 36-37, 93-94.)
The state moved for an in limine ruling on the admissibility of evidence
that Officer Cyr asked Loya “‘do you remember me from the jail?’” and “‘you have
a warrant, don't ya?’” (R., p. 65.) The state proffered the evidence to show that
Officer Cyr and Loya “knew each other through prior law enforcement contact
and that there was an outstanding warrant to be served on the defendant on the
date of this crime.” (R., p. 65.) The state addressed both relevance and the
potential for unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 and 404(b). (R., pp. 65-69; Supp.
Tr., p. 6, L. 25 – p. 9, L. 23.) Loya’s trial counsel responded by arguing that
although there was “some danger” of unfair prejudice in admitting evidence that
Officer Cyr asked Loya if he remembered him from the jail,
as long as the state doesn't focus extensively or more than that on
the defendant's past jail history, which is extensive, I think that
undue prejudice that they will infer he was guilty in this case
because of his status as being a frequent flyer so-to-speak back,
back in the day is hopefully mitigated.
(Supp. Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-24.) The district court ruled that it would “allow the fact
that the defendant was aware of this officer from prior experience in the jail so
long as that is not overly emphasized or punctuated.” (Supp. Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-21;
see also R., pp. 107-08.)
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The case proceeded to trial, at the close of which the jury convicted Loya
on both counts. (R., p. 157.) The district court imposed consecutive sentences
of five years with three years determinate for battery on a law enforcement officer
and

seven

years

methamphetamine.

with

six

months

(R., pp. 185-86.)

determinate

for

possession

of

The district court also denied Loya’s

motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp. 198-201.) Loya timely appealed from
the judgment. (R., pp. 183, 190.)
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ISSUES
Loya states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the State violate Mr. Loya’s right to a fair trial by
committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct which
appealed to the jury’s passions and prejudices?

2.

Did the district court err in allowing reference to Mr. Loya’s
past incarceration despite the fact that such evidence was
more prejudicial than probative?

3.

Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on
the elements of battery on a law enforcement officer?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Loya’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Loya failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s comments
during voir dire?

2.

Has Loya failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing
argument?

3.

Has Loya failed to show that he objected to admission of the part of the
recording of his encounter with Officer Cyr where Officer Cyr asked him if
he remembered him from the jail?

4.

Has Loya failed to show that the district court committed fundamental error
by utilizing the language of the battery on certain personnel statute in jury
instructions, except altering it to past tense?

5.

Has Loya failed to show any abuse of the district court’s sentencing
discretion?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Loya Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Comments
During Voir Dire
A.

Introduction
During voir dire the prosecutor asked whether potential jurors would “start

off police officers on the same level as everybody else before they testified and
listen to what they had to say before you decided whether to believe them.” (Tr.,
p. 64, Ls. 10-13.) She premised this question on the statement that “everybody
knows that police get experience and training through their official duties, which
can sometimes increase their reliability as witnesses.” (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 1-7.) The
potential jurors answered that they would not treat officer testimony differently
than other testimony. (Tr., p. 64, L. 10 – p. 66, L. 3.)
Defense counsel, in specific response to the prosecutor’s questions based
on training and experience, asked jurors if they would find officers less credible “if
they are accustomed to lying to suspects, telling them there's evidence that
doesn't really exist, so they can get a confession” or “because they deal with bad
people all day long, so then they become a little bit bad themselves to deal with
that.” (Tr., p. 114, L. 20 – p. 115, L. 6.)
For the first time on appeal Loya objects to the prosecutor’s comments in
voir dire, asserting they are fundamental error.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-15.)

Application of the correct legal standards to this claim shows it to be without
merit.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor,
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental
error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). To show
fundamental error:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).
C.

Loya Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The
Prosecutor’s Inquiry During Voir Dire
It is “well-established that great latitude is allowed during voir dire

questioning.”

State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 369, 313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013)

(internal quotes omitted). “[T]he right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is
fundamental to both the U.S. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution.” State v.
Lankford, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___, 35617, 2016 WL 4010851, at *2 (Idaho
July 25, 2016). An impartial jury is one without actual or implied bias. Id.
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In addition, “[a]ttempts by the prosecutor to secure a verdict on any factor
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial;
therefore, such is reviewable as fundamental error.” State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho
223, 228, 358 P.3d 784, 789 (Ct. App. 2015) (internal quote and ellipses
omitted).

However, “not every trial error or infirmity which might call for

application of supervisory powers correspondingly constitutes a failure to observe
that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.” Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (internal quotation omitted).

“To

constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.”
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). To expand due process analysis to
every objectionable argument by a prosecutor “leaves virtually meaningless the
distinction between ordinary trial error of a prosecutor and that sort of egregious
misconduct held in [Supreme Court precedent] to amount to a denial of
constitutional due process.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647-48.
It was certainly proper to address whether potential jurors would treat
testimony from law enforcement officers differently than from other witnesses. If
the prosecutor phrased that inquiry in a manner that was objectionable, such was
“ordinary trial error” rather than the “egregious misconduct” forbidden by due
process. Loya has failed to show clear or obvious constitutional error.
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Likewise, Loya has failed to show clear or obvious constitutional error
because the record shows his attorney, rather than object, specifically referenced
and responded to the prosecutor’s inquiry regarding officers’ reliability as
witnesses and inquired whether potential jurors would find them less reliable
because they sometimes lied in the course of their investigations and possibly
became bad because they addressed bad things so often. Loya has failed, on
this record, to show that the lack of objection was not tactical.
Finally, Loya has failed to demonstrate prejudice.

The prosecutor

specifically asked if jurors would treat officer testimony differently and none
responded that they would (and several responded that they would not).
Defense counsel likewise addressed the issue and found no potential juror who
would treat officer testimony differently than other witness’s testimony.
Moreover, the state’s case relied only marginally on the reliability of officers as
witnesses because its evidence included a damning recording of Loya’s attack
on Officer Cyr (State’s Exhibit 1), photographs of Officer Cyr’s injuries (State’s
Exhibits 2-6), and physical evidence of Loya’s possession of methamphetamine
(State’s Exhibits 7, 8). This record reveals no reason to believe that the trial was
rendered unfair by the prosecutor’s voir dire.
II.
Loya Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Closing
Argument
A.

Introduction
While arguing that “the victim [was] engaged in the performance of his

duties,” I.C. § 18-915(3)(b), the prosecutor stated:
8

Officer Justin Cyr has worked in law enforcement for a number of
years. It takes a special person to continue to do this job in today's
anti-law enforcement climate. And on November 4th of 2015, that's
what he was doing. He was doing his job, ferreting out crime in our
little town, following up on a report about a stolen couple of TVs at
somebody's house.
(Tr., p. 299, L. 18 – p. 300, L. 1.) The prosecutor also stated that Officer Cyr
was doing his job “nicely.” (Tr., p. 300, L. 25 – p. 301, L. 3.) Loya did not object
to the prosecutor’s argument.
For the first time on appeal, Loya claims that these arguments constitute
prosecutorial misconduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-15.) Specifically, he argues
that they were “an attempt to invoke sympathy” for the victim. (Appellant’s brief,
p. 11.) Loya has failed to show error, much less fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
To show fundamental error Loya must demonstrate from the record a

constitutional error; that the error is clear or obvious and that the lack of an
objection was not tactical; and that the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
C.

Loya Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The
Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
To be a due process violation the error must affect the fundamental

fairness essential to the very concept of justice. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642. To
rise to the level of a due process violation, prosecutorial misconduct must be
“egregious” and not “ordinary trial error.” Id. at 647-48. Arguments that are
“somewhat inflammatory because they were likely designed to appeal to the
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sympathies and passions of the jury” do not “rise to the level of fundamental
error.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (prosecutor’s argument that
the victim was “speaking from her grave” not fundamental error).
In this case the prosecutor’s comments are not even “somewhat
inflammatory,” much less a due process violation. The argument that Officer Cyr
was performing his job “nicely” was merely a comment on the evidence. State’s
Exhibit 1 shows that the prosecutor could have added that Officer Cyr was doing
his job “politely” and “competently.”

Likewise, the comment that it takes a

“special person” to continue working in law enforcement “in today's anti-law
enforcement climate” is not inflammatory, and even if it were it would only be
“somewhat inflammatory,” not a violation of due process.

It is certainly less

inflammatory than claiming the victim was speaking from her grave. Loya has
failed to show a due process violation, much less one that is clear or obvious.
Loya has also failed to show that the lack of an objection was not tactical.
This case involved an attack on and battery of a law enforcement officer doing
his duty. The jury was certainly aware of these basic facts. Likewise, the jury
was most likely aware that the job of a law enforcement officer is often difficult
and dangerous. Even if defense counsel had objected, and even if the objection
had been sustained, the net gain would have been minimal at best, and may
even have been a net loss in terms of jury appeal.
Finally, Loya has shown no prejudice. The prosecutor’s comments, if at
all inflammatory, were so minimally inflammatory in the face of the overwhelming
evidence that Loya in fact battered Officer Cyr (the only contrary evidence Loya
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claims is that Officer Cyr did not orally identify himself as a police officer as he
stood before Loya in his uniform (Appellant’s brief, p. 14)) that there is no chance
of prejudice.
Loya additionally argues that his claims of prosecutorial misconduct
should be addressed cumulatively. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.) Under the
doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in themselves, may
in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho
445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of the
cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins,
131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, cumulative error
analysis does not include errors not objected to unless those errors are found to
be fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982. Because Loya has
failed to show that either of his claims of prosecutorial misconduct are
fundamental error, he has failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine is
applicable to his case.

III.
Loya Has Failed To Show That He Objected To Admission Of The Part Of The
Recording Of His Encounter With Officer Cyr Where Officer Cyr Asked Loya If
Loya Remembered Him From The Jail
A.

Introduction
The state moved for an in limine ruling on the admissibility of evidence

that Officer Cyr asked Loya “‘do you remember me from the jail?’” and “‘you have
a warrant, don't ya?’” (R., p. 65.) The state specifically stated that it was not
seeking to introduce evidence regarding “any facts regarding the defendant's
11

prior Incarceration.”

(Id.)

Loya’s trial counsel responded there was “some

danger” of unfair prejudice in admitting evidence that Officer Cyr asked Loya if he
remembered him from the jail, but
as long as the state doesn't focus extensively or more than that on
the defendant's past jail history, which is extensive, I think that
undue prejudice that they will infer he was guilty in this case
because of his status as being a frequent flyer so-to-speak back,
back in the day is hopefully mitigated.
(Supp. Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-24.) The district court ruled that it would “allow the fact
that the defendant was aware of this officer from prior experience in the jail so
long as that is not overly emphasized or punctuated.” (Supp. Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-21;
see also R., pp. 107-08.)
Loya claims the district court erred because evidence that Loya knew
Officer Cyr was a law enforcement officer through his dealings with Officer Cyr in
the jail was “only minimally relevant” and was “far more prejudicial than
probative.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) The crux of Loya’s argument is that the
“from the jail” part of the evidence could have been eliminated without “impairing
the substance” of the evidence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 16, n.3; see also p. 18 (“It
was not necessary for the State to establish where Mr. Loya had previously seen
Officer Cyr.”).) This argument fails for two reasons. First, it was not preserved.
Second, removing the context that Loya knew Officer Cyr “from the jail” would
have removed the evidence’s probative value of showing that Loya knew Officer
Cyr was a law enforcement officer.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo.

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the
district court’s determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51,
205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).
C.

Loya’s Claim That The Court Should Have Ordered The Redaction Of The
“From The Jail” Part Of Officer Cyr’s Question Is Not Preserved For
Appellate Review
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.
If not raised below, the objection may not be considered for the first time on
appeal.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
As set forth above, the state wished to offer evidence that, upon encountering
Loya, Officer Cyr asked Loya if he remembered him “‘from the jail’” and Loya
indicated he did, without getting into any details about why Loya would have
known the officer “from the jail.” (R., p. 65.) Loya’s trial attorney acknowledged
that the evidence was relevant, that the state was “likely entitled” to admit the
evidence “regardless of our objection to that point,” and that its potential unfair
prejudice would be “mitigated” if the state “doesn't focus extensively or more than
that on the defendant's past jail history, which is extensive.” (Supp. Tr., p. 10, Ls.
5-24.)

The district court began its ruling by stating it was ruling “on the

stipulation,” ruled on both the warrant issue and the knowledge from jail issue,
13

and did not mention an objection until reaching the third issue of Loya’s
comments about Officer Cyr after the arrest. (Supp. Tr., p. 13, L. 7 – p. 14, L.
13.) From this record, it appears that the district court accepted a stipulation that
the evidence on the recording of the encounter was admissible, but that the state
could not get into Loya’s history or the reasons for why he would know Officer
Cyr “from the jail.”
Even if Loya’s counsel did not stipulate to the evidence, at no point did he
ask the court to redact the recording to eliminate the “from the jail” part of Officer
Cyr’s question. (Supp. Tr., p. 9, L. 25 – p. 11, L. 19.) Because Loya did not
request redaction of the “from the jail” language from the exhibit in the trial court,
his appellate claim that it was error to not redact the “from the jail” language from
the recording is not preserved.
Even if preserved, Loya has failed to show error.

Evidence may be

excluded if its potential for “unfair prejudice” substantially outweighs its probative
value. I.R.E. 403. “Unfair prejudice” is the tendency to suggest a decision on an
improper basis. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010).
One of the elements the state had to prove was that Loya, at the time of the
battery, “knows or reasonably should know” that Officer Cyr was a peace officer.
I.C. § 18-915(3)(b). Evidence that Loya knew Officer Cyr “from the jail,” where
Officer Cyr previously worked as a sheriff’s deputy, was highly probative of
Loya’s knowledge while the possibility of unfair prejudice was minimal. This
evidence was well within the district court’s discretion to admit.
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Loya argues it “was not necessary for the State to establish where Mr.
Loya had previously seen Officer Cyr,” and therefore the context of Loya’s
knowledge “had no probative value” and “was only minimally relevant.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) The fallacy of this argument is demonstrated from a
simple thought experiment. What if, instead of asking, “Do you remember me
from the jail?” Officer Cyr had asked, “Do you remember me from high school?”
The context is what makes Loya’s acknowledgement of knowing Officer Cyr
extremely probative and shows no abuse of discretion in weighing that against
any potential for prejudice.1
IV.
Loya Has Failed To Show That The District Court Committed Fundamental Error
By Utilizing The Language Of The Battery On Certain Personnel Statute In Jury
Instructions, Except Altering It To Past Tense
A.

Introduction
The battery on certain personnel statute provides, in relevant part, that

one of the elements of the crime is that the “person committing the offense
knows or reasonably should know that such victim is a peace officer.” I.C. § 18915(3)(b). The district court in this case provided a jury instruction that stated
this element as “MICHAEL ANTHONY LOYA, JR. knew or reasonably should
have known that Justin Cyr was a police officer.” (R., p. 145.)
1

The state also submits that the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial
shows that even if admission of the evidence was error that error was harmless.
“The [harmless error] inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational
jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the
challenged evidence.” State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923
(2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
15

For the first time on appeal, Loya contends the language of this element
constituted fundamental error.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-24.)

Because the

challenged language of the instruction merely converts the statutory language
(“reasonably should know”) to past tense (“reasonably should have known”),
Loya’s argument is without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
To show fundamental error Loya must demonstrate from the record a

constitutional error; that the error is clear or obvious and that the lack of an
objection was not tactical; and that the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
C.

Loya’s Claim That Converting The Statutory Language To Past Tense In
The Instruction Was Fundamental Error Is Without Merit
As stated above, the relevant statutory language is “reasonably should

know.” I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) (emphasis added). The challenged language in the
instruction was “reasonably should have known.” (R., p. 145 (language altered
from statute italicized).) It was, of course, necessary to change the present tense
used in the statute to past tense in the instruction because Loya’s knowledge at
the time of the crime, not at the time of trial, was what the jury had to find. Other
present tense language in the statute was also converted to past tense.
(Compare I.C. § 18-915(3) with R., p. 145 (changing “committing” to “committed,”
“is” to “was,” and “knows” to “knew”).) Loya’s claim of fundamental error, when
the only change in the instruction from the applicable statute was to convert the
statutory language to past tense from present tense, is without merit.
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V.
Loya Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed consecutive sentences of five years with three

years determinate for battery on a law enforcement officer and seven years with
six months determinate for possession of methamphetamine and denied Loya’s
motion to reduce those sentences. (R., pp. 185-86, 198-201.) Loya contends
the district court abused its discretion in its sentencing and the denial of his
motion for leniency. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-28.) Review shows those claims to
be without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
In determining whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion, this Court reviews all the facts and circumstances of the
case. To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show
that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive,
considering any view of the facts. The governing criteria, or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, ___, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016) (internal cites and
quotations omitted).
C.

The Sentence In This Case Was Reasonable
When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, the
most fundamental requirement is reasonableness. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. When
reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, this Court conducts
17

an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the
protection of the public interest. In deference to the trial judge, this
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ. Furthermore, a sentence fixed
within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be
considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Id. (internal cites, brackets, and quotations omitted).

Application of these

standards shows no abuse of discretion.
For

battery

on

a

law

enforcement

officer

and

possession

of

methamphetamine the district court imposed sentences totaling 12 years with
three and one-half years determinate. (R., pp. 185-86, 198-201.) It reviewed the
relevant sentencing materials and applied the correct legal standards. (Tr., p.
354, L. 22 – p. 355, L. 9.)

The district court specifically looked at Loya’s

character, including his uncle’s opinion of him, and concluded that Loya was at
that time “unsupervisable” on parole or probation. (Tr., p. 356, L. 22 – p. 357, L.
21.)

The district court concluded that, although giving Loya the maximum

applicable sentences would be reasonable, it wished to give Loya the chance to
change and merit supervision in the community, so it crafted the sentence to give
the parole system a chance to make a determination at a later time. (Tr., p. 357,
L. 22 – p. 358, L. 24.)

This was despite the fact that Loya had not taken

advantage of prior treatment opportunities provided by parole and the jail. (Tr., p.
358, L. 25 – p. 359, L. 7.) The court took into consideration the fact that Loya
committed the current crimes while on, but avoiding, community supervision.
(Tr., p. 359, Ls. 8-13.) The district court noted Loya’s “overall lack of remorse.”
(Tr., p. 359, Ls. 14-16.) The district court also denied a subsequent motion for
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reduction of sentence. (R., pp. 198-201.) The factors specifically identified by
the district court, plus the facts of the crimes and Loya’s terrible criminal history
(PSI, pp. 5-12), all support the district court’s exercise of discretion.
Loya argues the district court “failed to consider” mitigating factors.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 25.) Review, however, shows that the district court did not
fail to consider the factors cited by Loya. Rather, the district court made factual
findings with which Loya disagrees. Loya, however, has failed to claim, much
less demonstrate, that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous.
Loya contends the district court ignored his “supportive family,” specifically
citing to his uncle’s testimony about his character. (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.) The
district court, however, specifically addressed the uncle’s testimony about Loya’s
character and rejected it because Loya’s “history is the opposite of that.” (Tr., p.
356, L. 22 – p. 357, L. 21.)

Loya cites his substance abuse and claims of

willingness to undergo treatment (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26), but ignores the
district court’s contrary factual findings (Tr., p. 359, Ls. 2-7) (noting that Loya had
not “taken advantage of treatment opportunities”).

He points out that he

expressed remorse (Appellant’s brief, p. 26) but ignores the district court’s finding
of an “overall lack of remorse” (Tr., p. 359, Ls. 14-16). Loya’s argument that the
district court failed to consider mitigating facts is untrue; the district court
considered Loya’s mitigation claims but found the facts against Loya.
Loya’s claims regarding denial of his Rule 35 motion are at least as
frivolous. He claims he submitted “additional information” with his motion, but
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cites only to the motion itself. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.) The motion contains
only arguments by counsel. (R., pp. 195-96.) Loya’s argument is baseless.
Loya has failed to show any abuse of sentencing discretion. The record
supports the district court’s sentencing determinations.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2017.
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